Sampling as a Secondary Orality Practice and Copyright's Technological Biases

Citation: Shun-Ling Chen (2017) Sampling as a Secondary Orality Practice and Copyright's Technological Biases. The Journal of HIgh Technology Law (RSS)
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Download: https://sites.suffolk.edu/jhtl/files/2017/05/SAMPLING-AS-A-SECONDARY-ORALITY-PRACTICE-yxpkxm.pdf
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Summary

Describes sampling as a practice in secondary orality: "orality mediated by technologies that allow one to store, retrieve and distribute sound...which largely relies on the writing and printing culture."

Examines US court decisions, finds "have failed to understand sampling as a secondary orality practice, or resisted interpreting copyright law in a way that would accommodate it."

Walter Ong's analysis that "oral people consider words to be potent"; this might help understand Bridgeport's claim that sampling is "actual physical copying" relative to quoting text; sampling "resurrects the power stored in the sound recording".

Mentions perspectives supporting room for sampling, including widely sampled artists such as George Clinton and James Brown, free culture advocates, and critical race theory scholars.

Notes different dynamic of sampling from indigenous peoples, sounds which may be considered sacred, gathered for research practices, and which have been exploited broadly.

Theoretical and Practical Relevance

Suggests possibility that understanding of sampling as secondary orality and its uneasy relationship with copyright might inform questions of indigenous cultural rights and vice versa.