Literature Review:Identity

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Identity
Title Identity
Subject Psychology

(RSS)

Tags social psychology (RSS), identity (RSS), self (RSS)

Social psychologists conceptualize the self as having three important roots (Baumeister 1998)

  • a reflexive consciousness,
  • an interpersonal aspect, and
  • an executive function.

Each of these categories hosts a number of different properties that are relevant in the domains of consumer behavior and decision making.

Reflexive Self: Social psychologists discuss the property of reflexive consciousness – the fact that we may only observe our self but not ever really truly know it. Evidence for this seemingly outlandish assertion is strong and compelling. Psychologists such as Nisbett and Wilson (1977) take the extreme position that we can only infer our motivations based on our actions, rather than knowing what we actually like and dislike. In one study they showed that when they primed subjects with the word “seashell” and then later asked what kind of laundry detergent they liked, more often they would say “Tide.” When asked about why the chose Tide, subjects would reply with responses that seemed to imply they were privy to their motivations such as “my mom used it.” Nisbett and Wilson suggest that our feelings are automatic (like Zajonc 1980) and that we can only infer or guess as to why we have them. Given that we may only make inferences about what our self is, the collection of these inferences is what may defined as our self-concept – what we believe about ourselves to be true based on how we interact with the world (Higgins 1996). This self-concept is our identity – things about our self that we believe to be true. We are motivated to maintain our self-concept in a way that is self-enhancing, accurate, and consistent (Baumeister 1998 for a review). These motivations may lead us to act in ways that conform to internal or external norms (Cialdini and Trost 1998 for a review). Some scholars also feel that the self is multidimensional – that different aspects of the self can be made salient based on different situations (Markus and Kunda 1986, Tetlock and Manstead 1985). For example if we are the lone male in a room full of women our maleness becomes particularly salient (McGuire 1984).

Interpersonal Self: Self-concept and identity cannot exist in a vacuum. In fact the self would likely have no meaning if it were to be locked in a box somewhere deprived of contact with others and material objects. The self has an interpersonal aspect – we can only know ourselves through the eyes of others. When others give us feedback that differs from our own self concept we feel social stress (Burke 1991, Swann and Hill 1982). Furthermore we put a great deal of effort managing how others are likely to think about us by managing our presentation in an effort to gain practical and material rewards (see Baumeister 1998 for a review). We are motivated to engage in a process of social comparison and vicarious esteem when members or groups close to us are successful (Cialdini et al. 1976) but sometimes we might feel threatened (Festinger 1954). The degree to which someone is self monitoring helps understand how likely one might be vulnerable to situational factors (Snyder 1974) – low self monitors act in ways that are mostly consistent with their attitudes and behaviors are while high self monitors are more likely to conform to environmental cues.

Executive Self: The executive side of our self is the agent, decision-maker, and self regulator. This is the self that seems most consistent with the rational agent described in economic theory. The executive function is more active than passive and controlled rather than automatic, though it is debated if this control is real or illusory (Bargh and Chartrand 1999, Wegner and Wheatley 1999).