Freedom, ownership and copyright: why does Kant reject the concept of intellectual property?

From AcaWiki
Jump to: navigation, search

Citation: Maria Chiara Pievatolo Freedom, ownership and copyright: why does Kant reject the concept of intellectual property?.
Internet Archive Scholar (search for fulltext): Freedom, ownership and copyright: why does Kant reject the concept of intellectual property?
Wikidata (metadata): Q64496181
Download: http://eprints.rclis.org/12886/1/kant.pdf
Tagged:

Summary

Argues that Kant is sometimes incorrectly seen as an intellectual property forerunner. Instead, Kant builds on Roman property law in a way that anticipates continental moral rights.

Kant conceived as a book as an action, speech. Exclusivity to an authorized publisher is only useful to the extent it maximizes availability of the speech to the public, which is technology dependent. An authorized publisher is akin to an unauthorized speaker. There is no reason to restrict personal copying, nor derivative works: everyone can be a 'wreader'. Works of art are not speech and may be lawfully reproduced without restriction.

Distinguishes Kant's arguments from Fichte's, who equates physical property and copyright, the latter springing from originality, and advocates harsh punishment for unauthorized publishers.