Why Unification Is Neither Necessary Nor Sufficient for Explanation

Citation: Victor Gijsbers (2007) Why Unification Is Neither Necessary Nor Sufficient for Explanation. Philosophy of Science (2007)74:4, 481-500 (RSS)
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Summary

Gijsbers argues that Kitcher's unification theory, which seeks to explain phenomena based on a delimited bank of theories that he refers to as the explanatory store, suffers from circular logic which makes it an insufficient theory of explanation. The problems lies in that a single pattern can't have enough unifying power, therefore explaining it through this approach results in a spurious unification explanation. Kitcher attempts to resolve this by including other requirements that would eliminate patterns that could potentially produce spurious unifications. In other words, this requirements excludes in order to unify.

Gijsbers believes that Kitcher's theory does not provide enough constraints on explanatory power, stating that self-derived conclusions are not can't generate additional conclusions as the unification theory promotes, and conclusions can't be valid if they were already used in the premise of the explanation itself. In this way, unification provides circular conclusions that are not useful.

Unification also does not distinguish between generalizations and natural laws well. This is crucial because not every phenomena requires a natural law for explanation. Instead of a method of explanation, Gijsbers believes that unification should be used as a test of belief about the truth or probability of the premises of an explanation, rather than the entire explanation itself.