The pragmatic theory of explanation

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Citation: Van Fraassen, B. C. (1988) The pragmatic theory of explanation. VIn J. C. Pitt (Ed.), Theories of explanation. New York, NY: Oxford. (RSS)
Internet Archive Scholar (search for fulltext): The pragmatic theory of explanation
Tagged: Philosophy (RSS)

Summary

Van Frassen believes that explanations are not proposition or arguments, but is an answer to a why-question. Therefore, a theory of explanations must be a theory of why-questions. Many models have been used to understand explanation, the simplest being logic models (eg. A then B, therefore A caused B) can be inadequate because of its reductionist approach. However, van Frassen advocates for a simplifying hypothesis, which identifies propositions and arguments within their context, allowing multiple propositions to be considered while keeping the structure of the explanation simple. This will, naturally, only work if phenomena are simple enough for such a simple model to fit.

As a pragmatist, van Frassen focuses a great deal of this chapter on semantics. He defines the difference between a question (as an abstract entity) and a proposition (as a declarative sentence supported the explanation of that question). Direct, corrective complete and partial answers form a typology of answers.

Van Frassen identifies three factors that are integral to answering a why-question: 1. the topic (one of the facts/observations of the question) 2. the constrast-class (alternative propositions), and 3. the relevance relation (how relevant the propositions are to the question being asked). With these in mind, a why-question has three assumptions - that it's topic is true, that in its constrast-class (of the alternatives), only its topic is true, and that at least one of the propositions is relevant to the topic.

Rather than discussing explanation in terms of a relationship-like description between theory and fact, van Frassen sees explanation as a tripartite relationship between theory, fact and context. By ignoring the context of the relationship, explanations of relationships between theory and fact have failed to fit more than a few examples.