Inference to the Loveliest Explanation
Citation: Eric Barnes (1995) Inference to the Loveliest Explanation. Synthese 103 (RSS)
Internet Archive Scholar (search for fulltext): Inference to the Loveliest Explanation
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Summary
In the article, the author argues the problems or errors in the model of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) which was suggested by Lipton in his book (1991). Lipton recommends the notion of inference to loveliest potential explanation (ILPE), compares to likeliest one following his main purpose of explanation which should provide maximized understanding and his assertion that inferences are based on judgment about ability of theories to provide possible understanding of explananda. Lipton’s central thesis is that the judgment is based on a prior judgment of explanatory loveliness.
About Lipton’s model, the author brings up two main criticisms, (1) judgment of likeliness can be better than loveliness, and (2) judgment of loveliness cannot be matched with likeliness so that Lipton’s central thesis is problematic. Other several specific criticisms are following. About the case of the relationship between causes (‘history) and effect, the Lipton’s model cannot disentangle specific cause which derives difference among similar phenomenon. Lipton suggests to use Why question to state the condition for adequate answer and its form is that why P (the fact) rather than Q (the foil)? But P and ~Q can both exist in the same manner of P and Q and it is irrelevant to contrastive phenomenon.
The mechanism criterion of explanatory loveliness cannot serve as one for likeliness because the mechanism has no independent evidence but the evidences are all related to each other. Also, criterion for explanatory loveliness does not have to be precise since too precise criterion has low probability. And the author asserts that the unification of criteria. He points out the vagueness of ‘elegance’ and ‘simplicity’ criteria since complex and inelegant can offer rich understanding. In addition, the two terms are too vague and seems no reason to choose them.
He wonders whether or not loveliness criteria are actually conducive. Lipton says the validity of ILPE is natural but there is no supporting evidence. Lipton seems to accept the Causal Thesis of Understanding to understand the relationship between result/effect and histories but it is at odds with the notion of loveliest criterion which is close to unification.
