Functional Explanation: In Social Science

Citation: Jon Elster (1994) Functional Explanation: In Social Science. Readings in the philosophy of social science, Chapter 25 (RSS)
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Summary

Elaster thinks that functional explanation already culmiating with common and larger pattern and the explanation, or the serach for meaning derives from modern biology. There are strong and weak points in the functional explanation. The strong characteristic or Malinowski’s principle is that all social phenomena have beneficial consequences (intended or unintended, recognized or unrecognized) that explain them. This stance indicates both conservative (which explains social facts to social cohesion) and radical ideologies (to oppression and class rule). The weak point or Merton’s principle says whenever social phenomena have consequences that are beneficial, unintended and unrecognized, they can also be explained by these consequences. Merton points out ‘unintended and unrecognized’ factors which means there are something more between ‘cause and result’, ‘input and output’, or “natural selection”.

He asserts that functionalist sociologist’s arguing, in other words, putting some meaning to phenomenon which was tacitly presupposed is problematic. And text or explanation contains the reseacher’s intention, way he or she understands and his oppinion. But he also thinks that functionalist try to compound and generalize the concept of phenomenon. He introduces two people (Stinchcombe and Cohen) to explain premises of functional explanation.

Social science was regarded as similar to theory of natural selection and it has a presumption for equilibrium. But the Markov-chanin theory of social evolution Stinchocombe suggests differ from the previous notion of natural selection which means there are some cases cannot explained by the sequence of ‘A->B’ and cases that same problems need different solutions. Therefore the Markov chain model need differentant and specific institution.

Cohen claims that functional explanation needs mechanism such as general lawlike statements based on epistemological consideration not on substantive sociological theory. The law should have the structure that “If (if A, then B), then A.” and there are standard process for law such as proposing hypothesis, verifying the hypothesis with cases, testing by counterinstance, according both side and making law, and using the law.

The author disagrees with Cohen (agree with Stinchocombe) since there are possibility of existence of third factor C between A->B and sociology cannot invoke the same consequence in all case.