Explanatory Unification and the Causal Structure of the World

Citation: Kitcher, Philip (1989) Explanatory Unification and the Causal Structure of the World. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. vol. 13 Scientific Explanation. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. (RSS)
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Summary

This chapter in an edited volume serves to introduce previous modes of explanation, namely Hempelian deductive explanations and Pragmatism, while introducing Kitcher's theory of unification. The basis of this unification theory is that science can be used to enhance the understanding of various phenomena (facts that need explaining) by unifying their explanation. In this way, we can provide objective understanding of nature.

The Hempelian approach consists of using deductive arguments to explain the phenomena. One of the premises of this explanation must be a natural law, however, there are multiple problems associated with this form of explanation. Sometimes it can be difficult to distill an explanation into one concluding sentence, as this form requires. Additionally, historical narratives, such as in human history, are also not covered by natural laws, making this approach problematic to explain social phenomena in particular.

Pragmatics attempt to resolve some of this problems by calling for explanations that are contextualized. However, in contextualizing the explanation therein lies one of the problems of this approach. Pragmatism has the potential to trivialize the relevance (how relevance is determined is not resolved in Van Frassen's Pragmatism). Kitcher suggests pragmatism is a useful way of tackling some fundamental problems with explanation, nut it is not broad enough to be the whole story (the best approach to explanation).

Kitcher sees explanations as belonging to an "explanatory store", a bank of sorts from which ideal explanations can be derived. Ideal explanations are those that not only provide explanations, but outline how the explanation was achieved (derived from this explanatory store). The sets of arguments used to draw explanations should also be generative and balanced. In other words, there should be a tradeoff between minimizing the number of premises used (simplyfing the argument) and maximizing the number of conclusions that could be drawn from those arguments. The goal of Kitcher's theory of explanation is to create a simple, yet powerful theory from which to derive sound explanations to explain, as the title eloquently puts it, " the causal structure of the world".