Demand theories of the fertility transition: an iconoclastic view

Citation: Cleland, John G., Wilson, C. (1987) Demand theories of the fertility transition: an iconoclastic view. Population Studies (RSS)
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Tagged: uw-madison (RSS), wisconsin (RSS), sociology (RSS), demography (RSS), prelim (RSS), qual (RSS), WisconsinDemographyPrelimAugust2009 (RSS)

Summary

Dominance of economic causation in earliest theories of transition. The fact that is has remained so reflects several things: the common assumption that social changes is driven primarily by economic forces; the inherent plausibility of this notion when applied to human fertility; and the willingness of economists, unlike sociologists and anthropologists, to formulate precise concepts and hypotheses which, in principle, though frequently not in practice, are open to empirical validation. However, Cleland and Wilson argue that the central assumption of all economic theories does not provide a plausible explanation of fertility trends during the last 100 yrs. Our aim in this article, which builds upon an earlier analysis confined largely to WFS results, is to assess the implications of both historical and contemporary data for theories of reproductive change marital fertility only. Coale (1973): (1) fertility must be within the calculus of conscious choice, (2) effective techniques of fertility reduction must be known and available, and (3) reduced fertility must be perceived as advantageous. The most pervasive theme in transition theory is that the modernization of societies changes the economics of childbearing in such a way that a large # of children becomes disadvantageous to parents. Thus, decline is seen as rational. Modernization erodes the benefits of having children either directly or by providing more attractive alternatives. The transition from corporate kinships systems to extended families and, finally , to nuclear families brings about a progressive reduction in the social and economic advantages of large #s of children and fertility falls. According to Notestein (1945; 1953) the prime responsibility lay in the development of industrial and urban societies which undermined traditional values supporting high fertility. Becker (1960), and demand theory, also argue that reduced demand for kids in the fundamental driving force behind the transition, assuming that rational, self-interested people will choose to consume the goods that give them the greatest satisfaction. Caldwell's (1982) theory of intergenerational wealth glows unites the concept of economic demand for children with the cultural transmission of western ideas and values which ultimately undermine that demand. A reversal of the direction of wealth flows is the driving force behind fertility decline and the fundamental cause of this reversal is the emergence and transmission of the idea of the child-centered nuclear family, which replaces the extended family system with its vested interest in high fertility. The locus of reproductive decision-making shifts from extended family patriarchs to the conjugal couple. It is increasingly apparent that instances of birth control were limited to small (most elite) groups or came from studies based on small data sets which cannot be trusted, in pre-industrial times. While the existence of family limitation cannot be ruled out, it is highly unlikely that it was of any significance in determining the overall pattern of marital fertility. Cleland and Wilson's conclusions: 1. The conscious exercise of birth control within marriage in its modern parity-specific form is probably absent in most traditional societies. 2. This absence, and its implications of moderate to high fertility levels, does not necessarily imply that children possess a high economic value for their parents, no do fertility variations in pre-transitional societies appear to relate to concomitant variations in the economic role of children. 3. At the societal level, the timing of transition is strongly influenced by cultural boundaries and is associated rather with indicators of social development, such as literacy, than with economic indicators. Within societies, the same is true; the onset of demographic change is more closely associated with parents' education and cultural affiliation than with economic factors, such as familial control of economic life or women's employment. 4. The speed with which marital fertility decline due to birth control can occur in culturally homogeneous population, and its pervasive nature in all economic sectors testify to the diffusion of new ideas, rather than to changes in micro-economic forces, which are likely to act in contrary directions at the community or family level. 5. Declines in parents' demand for children (as indicated by survey data on preferences) do not appear to preceded fertility transition, nor are fertility aspirations markedly lower in more modern sectors, except in Africa; rather, the distinction between groups with unchanging fertility and those experiencing transitions is the propensity to translate desires into appropriate behaviors. The probable importance of ideational rather than structural change is our most significant conclusion. This conclusion is supported by a number of strands in the evidence: the weak links at either macro- or micro-level between economic structure and fertility; the stronger links with culture and education, both of which are likely to determine the initial acceptability of new ideas; and the quick spread of birth control within many societies. Caldwell's theory of wealth flows is essentially an ideational theory of change, involving the transmission of a new family morality, one of the consequences of which is to transform children from economic assets to economic liabilities.