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Framing Participatory Evaluation

2018-03-11T20:13:36Z

Zenobia: Created page with "{{Summary |title=Framing Participatory Evaluation |authors=J. Bradley Cousins, Elizabeth Whitmore |url=http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ev.1114/abstract |tags=evalua..."

{{Summary
|title=Framing Participatory Evaluation
|authors=J. Bradley Cousins, Elizabeth Whitmore
|url=http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ev.1114/abstract
|tags=evaluation, participatory evaluation
|summary=The chapter explores the meanings of participatory evaluation (PE) by identifying and explicating key conceptual dimensions. It also sets a framework for differentiating forms of collaborative evaluation and collaborative inquiry.

* Implications of PE: While doing an evaluation, researchers collaborate with individuals, groups or communities with an important stake in the program.
* Stakeholders: Those with a vested interest in the focus for evaluation, e.g. program sponsors, managers, developers, implementers and members of special-interest groups and program beneficiaries.
= Two approaches to participatory evaluation =
== Practical participatory evaluation (P-PE) ==
Core premise: Stakeholder participation in evaluation will enhance evaluation relevance, ownership, and thus utilization, which can be conceptualized in three types:
# Instrumental: Supporting discrete decisions;
# Conceptual: Contributing knowledge
# Symbolic: For persuasive or political use; reaffirming decisions that have already been made or to further a particular agenda
* Impact is conceptualized in terms of effects on an undifferentiated group of "users" or "decision makers.”

== Transformative participatory evaluation (T-PE) ==
Key concepts:
* Aim at empowering people through participation in the process of constructing and respecting their own knowledge and through their understanding of the· connections among knowledge, power, and control.
* The distance between researcher and researched is broken down; all participants are contributors working collectively.
* Critical reflection: Participants should question, doubt, and consider a broad range of social factors, including their own biases and assumptions.

== Comparison of the two approaches ==
The two forms of PE differ in their primary functions: practical problem solving vs. empowerment. Yet, there are clearly overlaps between P-PE and T-PE in that they lead to (1) an understanding of program functions and processes and (2) the development of skills in systematic inquiry that would empower the program practitioner. Moreover, the development of valid local knowledge, based on shared understanding and the joint construction of meaning, is integral to both forms of PE.

= Dimensions of collaborative inquiry =
# Control of the evaluation process: From researcher controlled to practitioner controlled
# Stakeholder selection: From primary users to all legitimate groups
# Depth of participation: From consultation to deep participation
|journal=New directions for evaluation
|pub_date=1998
|doi=10.1002/ev.1114
}}

Libertarian Paternalism

2018-02-25T22:09:47Z

Zenobia:

{{Summary
|title=Libertarian Paternalism
|authors=Richard H. Thaler; Cass R. Sunstein
|url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/3132220
|tags=paternalism; behavioral economics; policy intervention; rational decision-making
|summary=The authors argue that the anti-paternalistic fervor expressed by many economists is based on a combination of a false assumption and at least two misperceptions.

==== False assumption 1: People do a good job of making choices, or they do a better job than third parties could do ====

Research in psychology and economics have demonstrated that people do not always exhibit rational expectations, that people often exhibit dynamic inconsistency, and that people often fail to make forecasts that are consistent with Bayes’s rule.

==== Misconception 1: There are viable alternatives to paternalism ====

In many situations, both private and public actors must make a choice that will affect the choices of some other people. For example, a cafeteria owner must decide whether she (1) makes choices that she thinks would make the customers best off, (2) make choices randomly, or (3) make malicious choices that make the customers as obese as possible. Option (1) is apparently paternalistic but nobody would advocate options (2) or (3).

==== Misconception 2: Paternalism always involves coercion ====
Using the cafeteria owner example above, if the owner place fruits before dessert in the line and customers are free to choose whether they want to have fruits or dessert or both, then choosing option (1) is paternalistic but does not involve coercion.

After laying out the false assumption and misperceptions, the authors go on to argue that a more interesting question to ask is: How to choose among paternalistic options? They also propose a toolbox for this purpose:
# Select the approach that the majority would choose if explicit choices were required and revealed;
# Select the approach that would force people to make their choices explicit; and/or
# Select the approach that minimizes the number of options.
|relevance=The authors clarify the idea of libertarian paternalism by highlighting the false assumption and misconception underlying the critics of libertarian paternalism.
|journal=American Economic Review
|pub_date=2003
|subject=Economics
}}

Libertarian Paternalism

2018-02-25T19:02:41Z

Zenobia:

{{Summary
|title=Libertarian Paternalism
|authors=Richard H. Thaler; Cass R. Sunstein
|url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/3132220
|tags=paternalism; behavioral economics; policy intervention; rational decision-making
|summary=The authors argue that the anti-paternalistic fervor expressed by many economists is based on a combination of a false assumption and at least two misperceptions.

==== False assumption 1: People do a good job of making choices, or they do a better job than third parties could do ====

Research in psychology and economics have demonstrated that people do not always exhibit rational expectations, that people often exhibit dynamic inconsistency, and that people often fail to make forecasts that are consistent with Bayes’s rule.

==== Misconception 1: There are viable alternatives to paternalism ====

In many situations, both private and public actors must make a choice that will affect the choices of some other people. For example, a cafeteria owner must decide whether she (1) makes choices that she thinks would make the customers best off, (2) make choices randomly, or (3) make malicious choices that make the customers as obese as possible. Option (1) is apparently paternalistic but nobody would advocate options (2) or (3).

==== Misconception 2: Paternalism always involves coercion ====
Using the cafeteria owner example above, if the owner place fruits before dessert in the line and customers are free to choose whether they want to have fruits or dessert or both, then choosing option (1) is paternalistic but does not involve coercion.

After laying out the false assumption and misperceptions, the authors go on to argue that a more interesting question to ask is: How to choose among paternalistic options? They also propose a toolbox for this purpose:
# Select the approach that the majority would choose if explicit choices were required and revealed;
# Select the approach that would force people to make their choices explicit; and/or
# Select the approach that minimizes the number of options.

|relevance=The authors clarify the idea of libertarian paternalism by highlighting the false assumption and misconception underlying the critics of libertarian paternalism.
}}

Libertarian Paternalism

2018-02-25T19:01:57Z

Zenobia:

{{Summary
|title=Libertarian Paternalism
|authors=Richard H. Thaler; Cass R. Sunstein
|url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/3132220
|tags=paternalism; behavioral economics; policy intervention; rational decision-making
|summary=The authors argue that the anti-paternalistic fervor expressed by many economists is based on a combination of a false assumption and at least two misperceptions.

=== False assumption 1: People do a good job of making choices, or they do a better job than third parties could do===

Research in psychology and economics have demonstrated that people do not always exhibit rational expectations, that people often exhibit dynamic inconsistency, and that people often fail to make forecasts that are consistent with Bayes’s rule.

=== Misconception 1: There are viable alternatives to paternalism ===

In many situations, both private and public actors must make a choice that will affect the choices of some other people. For example, a cafeteria owner must decide whether she (1) makes choices that she thinks would make the customers best off, (2) make choices randomly, or (3) make malicious choices that make the customers as obese as possible. Option (1) is apparently paternalistic but nobody would advocate options (2) or (3).

=== Misconception 2: Paternalism always involves coercion ===
Using the cafeteria owner example above, if the owner place fruits before dessert in the line, and customers are free to choose whether they want to have fruits or dessert or both, then choosing option (1) is paternalistic but does not involve coercion.

After laying out the false assumption and misperceptions, the authors go on to argue that a more interesting question to ask is: How to choose among paternalistic options? They also propose a toolbox for this purpose:
# Select the approach that the majority would choose if explicit choices were required and revealed;
# Select the approach that would force people to make their choices explicit; and/or
# Select the approach that minimizes the number of options.
|relevance=The authors clarify the idea of libertarian paternalism by highlighting the false assumption and misconception underlying the critics of libertarian paternalism.
}}

Libertarian Paternalism

2018-02-25T18:58:09Z

Zenobia: Created page with "{{Summary |title=Libertarian Paternalism |authors=Richard H. Thaler }}"

{{Summary
|title=Libertarian Paternalism
|authors=Richard H. Thaler
}}

The Law and Ethics of Experiments on Social Media Users

2018-02-17T18:17:28Z

Zenobia: Created page with "{{Summary |title=The Law and Ethics of Experiments on Social Media Users |authors=James Grimmelmann, |url=http://james.grimmelmann.net/files/articles/social-media-experiments...."

{{Summary
|title=The Law and Ethics of Experiments on Social Media Users
|authors=James Grimmelmann,
|url=http://james.grimmelmann.net/files/articles/social-media-experiments.pdf
|tags=experimental social science, social media, Facebook, Institutional Review Board, the Common Rule
|summary=Social media networks like Facebook and OkCupid routinely conduct social psychological experiments by systematically manipulating people’s environment to test their reactions. While academics do conduct similar experiments, academics typically must obtain both approval from an Institutional Review Board (IRB) and informed consent from participants, neither of which is required in social media networks.

Legal regulations are in place to protect the health, safety, and dignity of research participants, as well as to ensure that the costs and benefits of research are distributed equitably, that research is not seriously compromised by researchers’ self-interest, and that researchers do not act in dishonest ways that threaten public trust. U.S. law implements the Belmont Report’s principles in the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Research Subjects (also known as the Common Rule), which specifies what and how information must be provided to research participants and requires each institution to have an IRB that ensures covered research is conducted ethically.

Three questions arise from looking at Facebook’s and OkCupid’s experiments through the lens of the Common Rule:
# Did the researchers perform regulated “research involving human subjects?”
# Did they obtain informed consent?
# Did they obtain IRB approval?

The author argues that these experiments conducted by social media networks fall into the category of research involving human subjects and that the terms of service users have agreed to do not constitute informed consent because users are not given the opportunity to opt out of these experiments. These experiments also have questionable standards; for instance, Facebook included minors in an emotional contagion study without notifying the parents of minor subjects nor did Facebook obtained the parents’ agreement. These experiments also violate the debriefing criterion in the Common Rule as subjects were not debriefed at all, or do not even realize that they were an experimental subject. Last but not least, these experiments were not approved by any qualifying IRB.

As much as the Common Rule reflects a consensus about academic research on social media users, the author believes that the Common Rule should cover corporate research on social media users and that social media IRB can be implemented in the form of an internal control for ensuring that companies understand all the research their employees are conducting on users. The author also notes that experimenting on users without informing them may constitute a deceptive, and sometimes unfair, trade practice. As such, the Federal Trade Commission is in a good position to require companies to disclose their research practices to users.
|relevance=This article discusses the ethics and legal implications of, as well as the need for regulations on, experiments conducted by social media networks, a prevalent practice among tech companies.
|journal=Colorado Technology Law Journal
|pub_date=2015
}}