Using Experimental Evidence to Design Optimal Notice and Takedown Process

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Citation: Lenka Fiala, Martin Husovec (2018/07/23) Using Experimental Evidence to Design Optimal Notice and Takedown Process.
Internet Archive Scholar (search for fulltext): Using Experimental Evidence to Design Optimal Notice and Takedown Process
Download: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3218286
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Summary

Authors model and run a game with parameters designed to (a) replicate observed notice-and-takedown behavior on platforms, namely many false positive notices and very few contestations of takedowns and (b) test impact of a hypothetical alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanism whereby ADR provider immunizes platform from copyright holder liability for decisions made by the ADR provider, users pay ADR provider a fee to contest platform decisions, and platform pays ADR provider a penalty for restored content (which according to the ADR provider's decision the platform has taken down wrongly). ADR mechanism results in fewer false positive takedowns and more contestations, subject to a number of assumptions, such as the ADR provider is able to immunize the platform.


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